We study airport slot allocation problems during weather-induced congestion. These real-life matching problems are important to airlines as the costs of delays are signicant compared to their prots. We introduce a new mechanism, Multiple Trading Cycles (MTC), to allocate landing slots. In contrast to the currently used mechanism, MTC is individually rational, Pareto ecient, strategy-proof, non-manipulable by postponing a ight cancellation, and respects property rights over slots. In addition, it is coreselecting when preferences are strict. The You Request My House -I Get Your Turn mechanism (Abdulkadiro §lu and Sönmez, 1999) is a special case of MTC.
Introduction
Although landing schedules are made in advance, unpredictable conditions may lead to reallocations of landing slots as the arrival capacity is often reduced below the number of initially scheduled ights.
1 During severe weather such as thunderstorms, low cloud ceilings, or snows, arrival capacity at the aected airport is reduced as it requires more time to land a plane.
2 This is a signicant economic problem: Weather-caused ight delays cost billions of dollars every year in the United States.
3 Even though such delays are inevitable, their eect can be mitigated by moving ights into earlier slots that have been vacated by canceled or delayed ights. In the United States, a centralized mechanism performs such reallocations to create a new landing schedule by utilizing relevant ight information reported by the airlines.
Whether a ight is canceled or delayed is privately known by the airline and is not known by the centralized mechanism until the airline reports this information to it. Vacant slots are valuable resources, so airlines' strategic behaviors may aect the eciency of the reallocations. A well-designed mechanism that provides incentives for airlines to report delays and cancellations promptly is required. In this paper, we formalize the reallocation problem as a generalization of housing allocation with existing tenants problem (Abdulkadiro §lu and Sönmez, 1999) and propose a new mechanism to reallocate landing slots. In contrast to the currently used mechanism, ours gives strong incentives for airlines to report ight delays and cancellations.
Currently, in the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) implements Ground Delay Programs to reallocate landing slots. When severe weather is forecasted (typically hours in advance), the FAA declares a ground delay program (GDP) is in eect, where the duration of the GDP is also specied (usually several hours). In a GDP, the FAA assigns new arrival times (landing slots) to aircraft departing airports in the contiguous U.S. and Canada to the aected airport. These aircraft are also assigned new (and usually delayed) departure times at their origin airports (while the aircraft are still on the ground).
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1 A slot at an airport is essentially a time interval that allows an airline to land a plane.
2 Unpredictable conditions are not limited to severe weather conditions. For instance, runway closures caused by aircraft incidents are also included. Our model can also be applied in this situation, see the last part of footnote 19 and the last part of footnote 24.
3 The total cost of all ight delays in 2007 was estimated at 31.2 billion dollars, in which 8.3 billion dollars were costs to airlines .
In this particular year, the weather's share of total delay minutes is 43.6% (it varies from 32.8%-49.7% in the period of 20042016. See https://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/help/aviation/html/understanding.html).
The costs of weather-caused ight delays are nontrivial to airlines as their prots were just 5 billion dollars (Air Transport Association, 2008) in the same year.
4 These new departures times are calculated based on the new arrival times.
For more details, see Section 17-9-1 of the Facility Operation and Administration. This document is available at https://www.faa.gov/air_trac/publications.
We now describe the relevant details of a current GDP: The FAA adopts a 2-step procedure to carry out the reassignment of landing slots. The rst step is to assign slots to ights. The current algorithm is called Ration-by-Schedule (RBS). It orders ights by increasing original scheduled time of arrival and then assigns slots sequentially. That is, the rst ight is assigned to the rst available GDP slot, the second ight is assigned to the second available GDP slot, etc.
5 RBS may assign slots to ights that have been canceled or delayed by their airlines and consequently cannot feasibly use their assigned slots. The airlines can adjust their schedule by substitutions and cancellations, but ight cancellations and delays may consequently create vacant slots in the landing schedule. The second step is to reassign these newly created vacant slots to airlines that can use them. The mechanism in place now is called Compression.
6 Compression uses information reported by the airlines (cancellations and earliest feasible arrival times of ights) to exchanges slots among them to produce a new landing schedule. Essentially, when an airline cannot use a slot, Compression exchanges it with a later slot that is owned by some airline that can use the original slot.
7 In the current GDP, the rst assignment is created by running RBS and possible Compression.
But as airlines update their information, Compression might be run multiple times.
Before RBS was adopted, the FAA used a mechanism called Grover-Jack, which assigns slots based on feasible departure times reported by the airlines. This mechanism suers from a problem called Double Penalty that gives incentives for airlines to hide private information.
8 By using the originally scheduled times of arrival instead of the reported feasible departure times to allocate slots, the double penalty problem was resolved. Therefore, it is crucial for any replacement of RBS to avoid the double penalty problem.
We now describe deciencies of RBS and Compression that motivate our analysis. We show that RBS does not respect a form of property rights before a GDP starts. Note that slots of dierent lengths are dierent objects. A GDP converts initial slots into GDP slots, but such conversion is just a re-division of time intervals. Under RBS, owning an early initial slot gives the airline an early GDP slot, which is not the same object it had at the beginning, while such time interval (of the GDP slot) might be entirely owned by another airline before the start of a GDP. A mechanism that respects property rights before a GDP starts would 5 The OAG schedule is considered to be the initial schedule in the industry.
6 So the currently used mechanism is a combination of RBS and Compression.
7 Compression moves ights up in the schedule to ll those vacant slots. For more details, see Schummer and Vohra (2013) or Vossen and Ball (2006a) .
8 Feasible departure times are private information of the airlines. Suppose a ight needs to delay its departure for 1 hour because of some mechanical issues. If a ground delay program (with Grover-Jack) is implemented in which the ight would be delayed for another hour, then its total delay would be 2 hours. This is known as the Double Penalty problem. If the airline had withheld the information, this ight would have been assigned a slot 1 hour earlier, which it could feasibly use in this example. As a result, airlines may intentionally withhold information to avoid double penalties.
endow a GDP slot to the airline that owns the entire time interval of this GDP slot before a GDP starts. RBS might lead to outcomes that are not individually rational and thus outside the core in our model. We show that Compression does not respect a form of property rights after a GDP starts (in reassignments).
9 Also, Compression produces outcomes that might be outside the core and is manipulable by postponing a ight cancellation (Schummer and Vohra, 2013) .
10 Moreover, it is not strategy-proof (Schummer and Abizada, 2017) . 11 We show that these negative results for Compression also hold in our preference domain. In addition, we show that Compression is not individually rational and not Pareto ecient.
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We propose a new mechanism, Multiple Trading Cycles (MTC), that will overcome the aforementioned problems. In our model, airlines have lexicographic preferences, in which each airline has an importance ranking over its ights. MTC solicits importance rankings and earliest feasible arrival times of ights from airlines. If the time interval of a slot is entirely owned by some airline, then this slot is considered to be owned by the airline in MTC. There are three stages in MTC. In the rst stage, each slot that is demanded by only 1 airline (in a sense we make precise below) will be identied and assigned. In the second stage, all slots being assigned are demanded by more than 1 airline. According to an ordering determined by MTC, an airline picks a slot for its most important remaining ight or picks a slot pro forma (if it has no remaining ight). If the airline picks a slot that is owned by another airline, then the latter can pick a slot for its most important remaining ight or pick a slot pro forma. If a cycle forms, each airline in the cycle picks a slot for its most important remaining ight or pick a slot pro forma. This stage nishes when each non-canceled ight has been assigned a slot. In the last stage, each airline that has canceled ights will get the same number of slots. (The last stage is consistent with RBS. MTC can also be used to perform reassignments, and the slots assigned in the last stage might be valuable in a subsequent reassignment.)
We now highlight some desirable properties of MTC. MTC avoids the double penalty problem as it does not use reported feasible departure times to allocate slots. In contrast to RBS and Compression, MTC respects a form of property rights before and after a GDP starts, produces outcomes that are individually rational, Pareto ecient and in the core (in this problem, the core might not be a subset of the Pareto set), is strategy-proof and non-manipulable by postponing a ight cancellation. By truth-telling, MTC minimizes the 9 Schummer and Vohra (2013) dene property rights based on core allocations from an initial endowment of landing slots and claim that Compression does not respect such a form of property rights.
10 Indeed, they show Compression fails a condition that is weaker than non-manipulable by postponing a ight cancellation.
11 Schummer and Vohra (2013) show that Compression is strategy-proof in their preference domain.
12 Schummer and Vohra (2013) show that Compression is Pareto ecient in their preference domain.
expected delays for each airline lexicographically. That is, for each airline, it minimizes the expected delay for the most important ight then minimizes the expected delay for the second most important ight, and so on.
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We provide two algorithms to nd the outcome of MTC. We also provide a modied version of MTC called Multiple Trading Cycles-2. MTC-2 has all the desirable properties of MTC while it possibly favors some airlines. Finally, we extend our model to allow indierences in preferences. In that extended model, a modied version of MTC with tiebreaking inherits most of the desirable properties while it possibly produces outcomes outside the core as agents might be in more than one cycle under their true preferences, where one of the cycles might lead to a better outcome for the agents (this does not happen in models where agents have unit demand and non-strict preferences).
Our mechanism might be useful in other applications. For example, when a set of objects (or tasks) is being distributed to several teams and team members have heterogeneous preferences, given each team has an internal ranking over its members, a slight modication of MTC can be used in this environment.
2 Related Literature
The two papers most related to ours are Schummer and Vohra (2013) and Schummer and Abizada (2017) . Importantly, both papers take RBS outcomes as initial endowments and focus on the reassignment step. In Schummer and Vohra (2013) , preferences are incomplete as not every pair of feasible landing schedules is comparable; they propose a mechanism called Trading Cycle (TC).
15 In Schummer and Abizada (2017) , the preference domain is larger 13 RBS minimizes the delay for each ight in a lexicographic order. It is easy to see it minimizes the delay for the rst ight then minimizes the delay for the second ight, and so on. Vossen and Ball (2006a) show RBS lexicographically minimize the maximum delay with respect to the original schedule. Their formulation is dierent, but the intuition is similar.
14 Two more applications are also related to our model (they are also mentioned in Schummer and Vohra (2013) ). One is when agents have multiple jobs/tests/orders that need to be processed sequentially by a number of servers/laboratories/warehouse. There might be constraints on submission times if these jobs cannot be prepared for processing before a certain date. Also, the rankings can vary, e.g., when a customer (of some agent) pays an expedite fee or cancel the order. The other application is related to geographic fairness in deceased organ donation. Suppose under some fair policy, each region receives a xed percentage of deceased organs. Agents are regions with queued patients. Instead of time constraints, there might be other considerations here (for example, tissue rejection or blood-type incompatibility). Regions' rankings over patients can vary as well, e.g., when some patient's condition deteriorates quickly or some patient dies.
15 They assume an airline is made better o only if it moves a ight up in the schedule while no others move down, so airlines' preferences are induced by feasible arrival times and the current landing schedule.
The current landing schedule is preference-incomparable with another landing schedule that puts some of airline a's ights in earlier positions and some in later positions.
In this paper and Schummer and Abizada (2017) , an airline might be made better o even if a ight is moved down.
than ours since they allow airlines to put arbitrary weights on ights, while lexicographic preference assumes that the weight of a ight is innitesimal compared to the weight of a more important ight. They separately consider airlines' incentives to report ights' feasible arrival times, relative delay costs (weights), and cancellations. They propose a mechanism called Deferred Acceptance with Self Optimization (DASO). DASO is not Pareto ecient (this is because DASO does not use weights, which is necessary to determine Pareto ecient outcomes). DASO is non-manipulable via weights and non-manipulable by postponing a ight cancellation, though it is still manipulable by intentional ight delay. By contrast, our mechanism achieves full strategy-proofness (non-manipulable via feasible arrival times and rankings) and Pareto eciency in a smaller preference domain. Furthermore, MTC is also non-manipulable by postponing a ight cancellation.
Another related paper is Abdulkadiro §lu and Sönmez (1999) . Indeed, when (i) no airline owns a canceled ight, (ii) each airline owns exactly one non-canceled ight, and (iii) each airline owns at most one GDP slot, our model degenerates to the housing allocation with existing tenants model, and MTC reduces to YGMH-IGYT (with random ordering).
Given
(ii) and (iv) no airline owns a GDP slot, our model reduces to a house allocation problem (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979) , and MTC reduces to random serial dictatorship. Given (i),
(ii), (v) each airline owns exactly one GDP slot, and (vi) each slot is owned by some airline, our model reduces to a housing market (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) , and MTC reduces to the core mechanism.
17 Kurino (2014) ; Kennes et al. (2014) ; Pereyra (2013) study dynamic object allocation problems with overlapping generations in house assignments, daycare assignments, and teacher assignments, respectively. They also propose mechanisms that respect the property rights over the objects induced by the allocation in the previous period. Konishi et al. (2001) also generalize the housing market. In their model, multiple types of indivisible goods are traded. They show that the core may be empty and there is no Pareto ecient, individually rational, and strategy-proof (deterministic) mechanism. In our context, we obtain positive results on these properties for MTC (which is stochastic). Chun and Park (2017) study a slot allocation problem assuming monetary transfers are feasible.
16 With unit demand, agents' preferences are trivially lexicographic.
(i) is non-trivial when some airline owns a GDP slot. Without (i), when some airline owns a GDP slot, the airline has the ability to remove it from the set of available GDP slots (see Section 6.1 for more details), and such feature is absent in the housing allocation with existing tenants model.
This mechanism is called Top Trading Cycle mechanism in Abdulkadiro §lu and Sönmez (1999); Sönmez and Ünver (2005) and YGMH-IGYT mechanism in Sönmez and Ünver (2010) .
17 In a housing market with strict preferences, there is a unique matching in the core (Roth and Postlewaite, 1977) , and Gale's top trading cycles algorithm (attributed to David Gale by Shapley and Scarf, 1974) can be used to nd the outcome of the core mechanism.
(i), (ii), (v) and (vi) imply that the number of ights equals the number of slots.
By contrast, we assume monetary transfers are infeasible.
In the transportation literature on GDP, optimization is the main focus.
18 Vossen (2002) proposes a proportional random assignment method, in which each ight is entitled to an equal share of each slot it can use. Balakrishnan (2007) uses the housing market model by treating ights as agents. These two papers do not take airlines' incentives into account. propose an algorithm called Ration-by-Distance that assigns slots to ights based on distance. They show that Ration-by-Distance minimizes total expected delay, while MTC minimizes the expected delays for each airline lexicographically.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 introduces the model; Section 4 illustrates the mechanism; Section 5 shows properties of the mechanism; Section 6 discusses extensions; and Section 7 concludes the paper. All proofs are in Appendix A, a summary of properties is in Appendix B, and two examples for Compression are in Appendix C.
Model
There is a nite set of airlines A and a nite set of ights 
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There is an earliest feasible arrival time e f ∈ S for each ight f ∈ F , and f can be feasibly assigned to a slot s n only if e f ≤ s n .
20 With a slight abuse of notation, we use n instead of s n to express e f in our examples. Let e = (e f ) f ∈F be the vector of all earliest feasible arrival times and e a = (e f ) f ∈Fa be the vector of airline a's earliest feasible arrival times. A landing schedule is an injective function Π : F → S that assigns each ight to a 18 See Vossen and Ball (2006a,b) ; Bard and Mohan (2008) ; Ball et al. (2009); Glover and Ball (2013 We denote a subset of GDP slots owned by some airline a by Φ(a), where Φ : 
, the set of initial slots owned by airline a is Φ o (a).
Preferences
An airline's preference over landing schedules might be induced by numbers passengers on ights, future needs of aircraft, ights' operating costs, deadlines for crews timing out, etc. As pointed out in Schummer and Abizada (2017) , it may be impractical for airlines to evaluate and report their full preferences over landing schedules as such complex information is unique to every GDP. To simplify the problem, we assume airlines have lexicographic preferences.
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Each airline has an importance ranking over its ights. ∀a ∈ A, let R a be a strict total order over F a . If f ∈ F a is more important than f ∈ F a , we write f R a f . Let R = (R a ) a∈A be the importance ranking prole. All else being equal, airline a prefers ight f ∈ F a to land as early as possible (but not earlier than e f ). Given a landing schedule Π ∈ M, we dene the delay for each ight f by d f (Π) = Π(f ) − e f , where Π(f ) is the slot assigned to f in Π.
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Airline a's preference over feasible landing schedules is induced by R a and e a . For any two feasible landing schedules Π and Π , airline a (lexicographically) prefers Π to Π if and only if the rst non-zero coordinate of x a = (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x |Fa| ) is positive, where
.., |F a |} and f a,i R a f a,i+1 , and we write Π a Π . Conversely, if the rst non-zero coordinate of x a is negative, Π is preferred to Π. If airline a is indierent between Π and Π , 21 In the two-sided many-to-one matching literature, Dutta and Massó (1997) study a model where the one side agents have lexicographic preferences, and Abizada and Dur (2017) study a model with complementarities where the many side agents have lexicographic preferences. Schulman and Vazirani (2012) and Saban and Sethuraman (2014) study allocation of divisible goods under lexicographic preferences. Fujita et al. (2015) study exchange with multiple indivisible goods under lexicographic preferences. Ehlers (2002) and Ehlers (2003) A schedule lottery is a probability distribution over the set of all landing schedules M.
Let ∆M denote the set of all schedule lotteries. We denote a schedule lottery by L = p Π ·Π where p Π ∈ [0, 1] is the probability weight of landing schedule Π and Π p Π = 1. We now extend an airline's preference to allow it to compare schedule lotteries. Given a schedule 
Mechanisms and Their Properties
In an instance I, parameters other than R and e are xed. R and e will be reported by the airlines. A (direct) schedule mechanism ϕ : (R, e) → M is a mapping that selects a landing schedule for every strategy prole (R, e). Let ϕ f (R, e) be the slot that is assigned to f in ϕ(R, e), and ϕ a (R, e) be the landing schedule for a in ϕ(R, e). A (direct) lottery mechanism φ : (R, e) → ∆M is a mapping that selects a schedule lottery for every strategy prole (R, e). φ f (R, e) and φ a (R, e) are dened analogously. The strategy space for airline a is R a × S |Fa| , where R a is the set of strict total orders over F a and S |Fa| is the vector space of airline a's earliest feasible arrival times.
A schedule mechanism ϕ is regular if for any strategy prole (R, e), the induced ownership function Φ ϕ(R,e) is consistent with ϕ(R, e). Let φ(R, e) be a realized landing schedule of the schedule lottery φ(R, e). A lottery mechanism φ is regular if for any strategy prole (R, e) and any realization φ(R, e) , the induced ownership function Φ φ(R,e) is consistent with φ(R, e) . A schedule mechanism ϕ is feasible (non-wasteful) if for any strategy prole (R, e), ϕ(R, e) is feasible (non-wasteful).
23 When there are multiple runways (as in Section 6.2), Π ∼ a Π implies Π a is eectively the same as Π a .
A schedule mechanism or lottery mechanism is strategy-proof if truth-telling is a dominant strategy in its induced preference revelation game. A landing schedule Π is Pareto ecient if Π such that (i) ∀a ∈ A, Π a Π, and (ii) ∃a ∈ A, Π a Π. The set of Pareto ecient landing schedules is the Pareto set. A schedule mechanism ϕ is Pareto ecient if for any strategy prole (R, e), ϕ(R, e) is Pareto ecient.
Let Φ ex ante (a) be the set of available GDP slots that their time intervals are entirely owned by airline a before the GDP starts.
An airline has the right to swap its own ights within its own set of slots.
25 A landing
Sa a a Π a . Since the preference of airline a ∈ A is strict, Π Sa a is necessarily unique. To construct Π Sa a , order slots in S a in ascending order, assign a's most important ight to the earliest slot that it can feasibly use, then assign a's second most important ight to the earliest slot (among those remaining) that it can feasibly use, and so on until there is no more slot or no more ight.
A landing schedule Π is individually rational if ∀a ∈ A, Π a a Π Sa a . A schedule mechanism ϕ is individually rational if for any strategy prole (R, e), ϕ(R, e) is individually rational. A landing schedule Π is in the core if no subgroup of airlines could reallocate their slots to each other and make themselves better o than in Π. Formally, a landing schedule Π is in the core if Π and A ⊆ A such that (i) ∀f ∈ ∪ a∈A F a , Π (f ) ∈ S A , and (ii) ∀a ∈ A , Π a Π.
26 A schedule mechanism ϕ is core-selecting if for any strategy prole (R, e), ϕ(R, e) is in the core. If S A is empty, then any feasible mechanism is individually rational and core-selecting. 27 Schummer and Vohra (2013) consider that Compression does not respect property rights because it might produce outcomes outside the core. We propose the following explicit denition for mechanism instead. 28 A schedule mechanism or lottery mechanism respects property rights over S A if ∀a ∈ A, ∀s ∈ S a , a can use the slot by itself or trade it for a
See footnote 20 for the denition of s n .
In the case that there are runway closures caused by aircraft incidents and only one runway left, the construction of Φ ex ante (a) should follow the description in Section 6.2.2 rather than the description here.
better slot if there is any. A slot s is better than s for a if (i) s can be used by a ight f ∈ F a that has not been assigned a slot or is currently assigned a slot later than s , (ii) s cannot be used by a ight f ∈ F a that is more important than f , or s can be used by f but f is currently assigned a feasible slot earlier than s. We say a mechanism respects property rights before a GDP starts if it respects property rights over Φ ex ante (A), and we say a mechanism respects property rights after a GDP starts if it respects property rights over Φ(A).
29 So a mechanism respects property rights before and after a GDP starts if it respects property rights over S A .
A lottery mechanism is ex post individually rational if it only gives positive probability to landing schedules that are individually rational. A lottery mechanism is ex post Pareto ecient if it only gives positive probability to landing schedules that are Pareto ecient.
Other ex post properties for a lottery mechanism are dened analogously.
The Mechanism
Given a set X , a (priority) ordering (of its elements) is a bijective function z(X ) :
We dene the Multiple Trading Cycles mechanism to be a mechanism that produces a landing schedule for each input using the following algorithm. 
and e f > s(−1), where s(−1) is the last slot before s in S 0−0 (f occupies s inΠ and will not compete for slots earlier than s. Since inΠ, all ights that arrive strictly earlier than f will get a slot strictly earlier than s, this condition also implies that ∀f ∈ F 0−0 with e f ≤ s(−1),Π −1 (f ) ≤ s(−1). Therefore, there are sucient slots to accommodate ights that arrive earlier than f , so they will not compete for s);
(all ights that want s belong to a).
(We say s is demanded only by airline a (not can be used only by a) if (c-i) and (c-ii) hold simultaneously (note that (c-i) is trivially satised if s is the earliest occupied slot) and s is 29 TC in Schummer and Vohra (2013) and DASO in Schummer and Abizada (2017) indeed respect property rights after a GDP starts.
demanded by more than 1 airline if either (c-i) or (c-ii) fails (such a slot might be assigned to dierent airlines in dierent feasible and non-wasteful mechanisms). For each slot in S 0−t (see below, t = 0, 1, ...), it is a non-scarce resource if it is demanded only by 1 airline, and it is a scarce resource if it is demanded by more than 1 airline. We can further categorize the slots in S 0−t into four groups: type 1 slots satisfy (c-i) but not (c-ii), type 2 slots do not satisfy both, type 3 slots satisfy (c-ii) but not (c-i), and type 4 slots satisfy both. Only type 4 slots are non-scarce resources.
Example 1:
The number below each ight is its earliest feasible arrival time (we use n to mean s n for e f as mentioned, so e f a,1 = 1 means e f a,1 = s 1 ). In this example, S 0−0 = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 } and Π is shown in the table above. s 1 is a type 1 slot since (c-i) is trivially satised as s 1 is the earliest occupied slot but (c-ii) fails as f b,1 also wants s 1 . s 2 is a type 2 slot since (c-i) fails as f b,1 wants s 1 and (c-ii) fails as e f a,
s 3 is a type 3 slot since (c-i) fails as f c,1 wants s 2 but (c-ii) is trivially satised (there is no such f ). s 4 is a type 4 slot as (c-i) and (c-ii) hold simultaneously. It is easy to see that f d,1 will not compete for slots earlier than s 4 and there are sucient slots to accommodate ights that arrive earlier than f d,1 , so those ights will not compete for s 4 . Also, there is no other ight arrives at the same time or later. Therefore, any feasible and non-wasteful mechanism will assign s 4 to f d,1 . The pre-competition stage identies and allocates type 4 slots to avoid strategic issues that we will discuss later.) Assign s to f a,i , where f a,i ∈ F 0−0 a is the most important ight with e f ≤ e f a,i ≤ s. Remove f a,i from F 0−0 and s from S 0−0 . If f = f a,i , modifyΠ in the following way: Start from f , move each ight to the next slot in S 0−0 untilΠ(f a,i ) is lled. For t = 0, 1, ..., (alternatively, one can draw a surrogate at a time (without replacement) and let the rst surrogate of a ∈ A be a(1), the second be a (2), and so on). Denote the resulting ordering by z. Let a(i) ∈ {a (1) 
(according to R a ); we call it a duplicate ight of a (each of these ights will be assigned pro forma the slot it was assigned in the pre-competition stage. They are here to reward airlines that gave them slots and so property rights over those slots are respected). Let a(i) ∈ {a(|F a |+1), ..., a(|F o a |)} represent a canceled ight of a; we call it a dummy ight of a (to be consistent with RBS, airlines with canceled ights will get the same number of of slots).
Step 1 -Without loss of generality, let a(1) be the rst ight in z.
(i) If a(1) is a dummy ight, remove it and skip to the next ight in line. If a(1) is a remaining ight, let a(1) pick the earliest feasible slot in
is a duplicate ight, let a(1) pick the earliest feasible slot in S 1 \ S main .
(ii) If a(1) picks a slot in (a) S 1 ∩S a , (b) S 1 \S A or S 1 ∩S b but b has no remaining/duplicate ight in F 1 , assign this slot to a(1), go to the next step.
(iii) If a(1) picks a slot s ∈ S 1 ∩ S b and b has a remaining/duplicate ight in F 1 , modify z by inserting b(1) in front of a(1).
(iii-i) If b(1) picks a slot in S 1 \ S A or a slot in S 1 ∩ S c but c has no remaining/duplicate ight in F 1 , assign this slot to b(1) and assign s to a(1), go to the next step. where (iii) is a generalization of (iii): For (iii-i), replace assign this slot to... by then it will be in case (iii-iv)-(b). For (iii-iii), replace then it will be in case (ii)-(b); otherwise, apply (iii) by then it will be in case (iii-iv)-(b); otherwise, apply (iii) .
For each airline a ∈ A, let s a be some slot in S 1−t ∩ S a for some t ∈ N. If there is (a) a cycle (x(k), s y , y(·), ..., s z , z(·), s x ) of slots and most important remaining/duplicate ights such that x(·) picks s y ,..., z(·) picks s x (a (1) is not in the cycle), remove all ights in the cycle by assigning them the slots they pick. Let
If s x is demanded by the ight that inserted x(k), let it pick the next available slot (if x(k) is inserted by x(k − 1), then check if s x is demanded by the ight that inserted x(k − 1), and so on. Denote the ight of x that was inserted by another airline by x(·)); otherwise, modify z by inserting x(k + 1) behind x(k). If there is no x(k + 1) or x(k + 1) is a dummy ight, then it will be in case (iii-iv)-(b). Otherwise, apply (iii) to x(k + 1) with S 1−(t+1) in place of S 1 , F 1−(t+1) in place of F 1 , and the ight that inserted x(·) in place of a(1).
After possible repetitions of (iii-ii), (iii-iii) and (iii-iv)-(a), at the end, there must be Step n ≥ 2 -Without loss of generality, let a(i) be the next ight in line.
(i) If a(i) is a dummy ight, remove it and skip to the next ight in line. If a(i) is a remaining ight, let a(i) pick the earliest feasible slot in
ight in F n , assign this slot to a(i), go to the next step.
(iii) If a(i) picks a slot s ∈ S n ∩ S b and b has a remaining/duplicate ight in F n , modify
(iii-i) If b(j) picks a slot in S n \ S A or a slot in S n ∩ S c but c has no remaining/duplicate ight in F n , assign this slot to b(j) and assign s to a(i), go to the next step.
Let a(i) pick the next available slot in S n−1 .
When (iii-ii), (iii-iii) or (iii-iv)-(a) are repeated, for t = 1, ..., update S n−t to S n−(t+1) and
If there is no b(j + 1) or b(j + 1) is a dummy ight, then it will be in case (ii)-(b); otherwise, apply (iii) to b(j + 1) with S n−1 = S n−0 \ {s } in place of S n and For each airline a ∈ A, let s a be some slot in S n−t ∩ S a for some t ∈ N. If there is (a) a
, remove all ights in the cycle by assigning them the slots they pick. Let
If s x is demanded by the ight that inserted x(k), let it pick the next available slot (if x(k) is inserted by x(k − 1), then check if s x is demanded by the ight that inserted x(k − 1), and so on. Denote the ight of x that was inserted by another airline by x(·)); otherwise, modify z by inserting x(k + 1) behind x(k). If there is no x(k + 1) or x(k + 1) is a dummy ight, then it will be in case (iii-iv)-(b). Otherwise, apply (iii) to x(k + 1) with S n−(t+1) in place of S n and F n−(t+1) in place of F n , and the ight that inserted x(·) in place of a(i).
After possible repetitions of (iii-ii), (iii-iii) and (iii-iv)-(a), at the end, there must be
, s a ). Remove all ights in the chain/cycle by assigning them the slots they pick. Go to the next step.
Denote the resulting sets by S n+1 and F n+1 .
The main stage stops when F k = ∅ for some k ≥ 1.
Supplemental Stage:
Let V = S \ S 0−0 be the set of remaining vacant slots. Start from the earliest slot in V ∩ S A , if a slot is in some S a and a has a dummy ight, assign it to a and remove a dummy ight of a. Repeat until there is no more slot can be assigned by the above procedure. Denote the resulting set by V 1 . Assign the earliest slot in V 1 to the dummy ight with the highest order in z. Repeat until there is no more dummy ight.
Remark 1: (iii-i) to (iii-iv), which provide a complete picture of all cycles that are triggered by a(i), are not explicitly described in the YGMH-IGYT algorithm if an existing tenant j is inserted to the top by i, then the step can simply start over. This is because when j picks a vacant house or a house of another existing tenant who is already assigned another house, i is next in line to pick the vacated house of i (in the language of our model, this vacated house is a slot in S n ∩ S i but i has no remaining/duplicate ight in F n In general, at
Step h:
• Each remaining ight in F h points to the earliest feasible slot in S h ∩ S main ;
• Each duplicate ight in F h points to the earliest feasible slot in S h \ S main ;
• Each slot in S h \ S A or S h ∩ S a (∀a ∈ A) but a has no remaining/duplicate ight in F h points to the remaining/duplicate ight in F h with the highest priority in z (if such ight is a dummy ight, remove it and skip to the next ight in line); and
• Each slot in S h ∩ S a (∀a ∈ A) and a has a remaining/duplicate ight in F h points to the most important ight in F h ∩ F a .
Since |F | and |S 0−0 | are nite, there is at least one cycle. Each airline can be in at most 1 cycle in each step. Every ight in a cycle is assigned (or assigned pro forma) the slot that it points to and removed with such slot. Whenever there is a slot in S h \ S A or S h ∩ S a but a has no remaining/duplicate ight in F h in a cycle, the remaining/duplicate ight in F h with the highest priority in z is also in the cycle. The set of slots that are not removed at the end of Step h is denoted by S h+1 . The set of ights that are not removed at the end of
Step h is denoted by F h+1 . The main stage stops when F h = ∅ for some h ≥ 1.
Theorem 1: For a given ordering z, Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 produce the same outcome.
Note that in Algorithm 2, a cycle that is not removed at any step remains a cycle at the next step (as the earliest feasible slots for the ights in a cycle still remain). Therefore, removing one cycle (instead of multiple) at a time will not change its outcome. Algorithm 1 removes cycles in Algorithm 2 one at a time but possibly multiple at a step. Recall (iii-ii) Claim 1: S 0−0 is assigned in any feasible and non-wasteful landing schedule Π.
There is a pattern for scarce resources. Scarce resources are sequences of adjacent slots in S main such that each sequence starts with a type 1 slot and ends with a type 3 slot. Each sequence contains one type 1 slot, some type 3 slots, and possibly some type 2 slots. In any feasible and non-wasteful landing schedule, a ight that gets a slot in a sequence inΠ will always get a slot in the same sequence (it is infeasible to get a slot earlier than the sequence as (c-i) holds for the rst slot in the sequence. It is wasteful if the ight gets a slot later than the sequenceby feasibility, the number of ights that can feasibly use the slots in the sequence is xed, the ight gets a slot later than the sequence implies there exists some slot in S 0−0 that is empty); a ight that gets a slot outside a sequence inΠ will never get a slot in that sequence (it is infeasible to get a slot in a sequence earlier than the slot it gets inΠ as (c-i) holds for the type 1 or type 4 slot that locates right after the sequence in S main . It is wasteful if the ight gets a slot in a sequence later than the slot it gets inΠby feasibility, the number of ights that can feasibly use the slots earlier than this sequence is xed, the ight gets a slot in this sequence implies there exists some slot earlier than this sequence in S 0−0 is empty). A type 1 slot can be followed by a type 3 slot. Also, there might be more than one type 3 slot.
Example 2:
In the left table above, s 1 / ∈ S 0−t . It is easy to see that s 1 is a type 1 slot and s 3 is a type 3 slot in S 0−t . In the right table above, s 4 is also a type 3 slot.
Airline a's probability of getting the rst position in z is
. Given it gets the rst position, the probability of getting the second position declines to
. Airline a pays positions a(|F 1 a | + 1), ..., a(|F a |) (possibly to other airlines) for the slots it obtains in the pre-competition stage. These positions have zero values to a (with respect to a ), but they might be valuable to other airlines.
Recall that when (i) no airline owns a canceled ight, (ii) each airline owns exactly one non-canceled ight, and (iii) each airline owns at most one GDP slot, MTC reduces to YGMH-IGYT (with random ordering) as the pre-competition stage and the supplemental stage become redundant. However, one can modify YGMH-IGYT by using the precompetition stage: Fix an ordering. If a house is acceptable to only one agent i and the house is his top choice, assign this house to i. If the house is owned by some agent j, let j take i's position if it is earlier than j's position (in the ordering) and i's house if i owns a house.
Repeat this procedure until there is no more such house. Then run YGMH-IGYT with the reduced ordering (with these i's eliminated). The outcome does not change because j would be inserted in front of i when it is i's turn or i has been inserted as some agent demands i's house. Each agent that is assigned a house here always obtains the same house (in any acceptable and non-wasteful mechanism). In Section 6.1, we discuss another modication that is also meaningful to MTC but insignicant to YGMH-IGYT.
Subsequent Reassignments
In the current GDP, the rst assignment is created by running RBS and possible Compression. But as airlines update their information, Compression might be run multiple times.
MTC can also be used to perform reassignments.
A new instance is a tupleĨ = (S,Ã,F o ,R,ẽ,Φ), whereΦ is the slot ownership function from the last assignment restricted toÃ andS.
30 If an airline freezes a ight in a slot s ∈ S a (airlines will also have the capability to freeze ights they don't want moved up through the submission of an earliest time of arrival (Wambsganss, 1996) (Π(f a,1 ), Π(f a,2 ) , ..., Π(f a,7 )). Airline b and c's preferences can be expressed similarly. Now we run MTC.
Pre-competition stage: A tentative landing scheduleΠ is created as shown in the second table above and the set of occupied slot S 0−0 is {s 1, s 2 , ..., s 13 }.
The rst type 4 slot is s 1 as it is demanded only by c with f c,3 , so f c,3 is assigned this slot. The resulting sets are S 0−1 and F 0−1 .
The second type 4 slot is s 10 as it is demanded only by a with f a,5 , f a,6 , f a,7 , so the most important ight among these three, f a,5 , is assigned this slot. SinceΠ(f a,5 ) = s 11 , s 11 is empty now. UpdateΠ by moving f a,6 into s 11 . The resulting sets are S 0−2 and F 0−2 .
The third type 4 slot is s 11 as it is demanded only by a with f a,6 , f a,7 , so the most important ight among these two, f a,6 , is assigned this slot. The resulting sets are S 0−3 and Now all slots are demanded by more than 1 airline (s 12 is demanded by a with f a,6 and b with f b,3 ). S main = S 0−3 = {s 2 , s 3, ..., s 9 , s 12 , s 13 } and a(1), ..., a(5) represent f a,1 , f a,2, , f a,3 , f a,4 , f a,7 (remaining ights), respectively. a(6) and a (7) represent f a,5 and f a,6 (duplicate ights), respectively. b(1), ..., b(3) represent f b,1 , ..., f b,3 , respectively. b(4) represents f b,(1) (dummy ight). c(1) and c(2) represent f c,1 and f c,2 , respectively. Lastly, c(3) represents f c,3 . S 1 = S 0−0 and F 1 = F .
Step 1: a(1) picks s 2 ∈ S 1 ∩ S a for f a,1 . f a,1 is assigned this slot. The resulting sets are S 2 and F
. ((ii)-(a))
Step 2: a(2) picks s 3 ∈ S 2 \ S A for f a,2 . f a,2 is assigned this slot. The resulting sets are S 3 and F
. ((ii)-(b))
Step 3: a(3) picks s 4 ∈ S 3 ∩ S c for f a,3 and c has a remaining/duplicate ght in F 3 , modify z by inserting c(1), c's most important remaining/duplicate ght in F 3 , in front of a(3). c(1) picks s 6 ∈ S 3 ∩ S a for f c,1 . a(3) and c(1) form a cycle. f c,1 is assigned s 6 and f a,3
is assigned s 4 . The resulting sets are S 4 and F
. ((iii-vi)-(c))
Step 4: b(1) picks s 8 ∈ S 4 \ S A for f b,1 . f b,1 is assigned this slot. The resulting sets are S 5 and F 5 .
Step 5: Note that c(1) has been inserted in front. Now a(4) picks s 7 ∈ S 5 \ S A . f a,4 is assigned this slot. The resulting sets are S 6 and F 6 .
Step 6: b(2) picks s 5 ∈ S 6 \ S A for f b,2 (s 2 , s 3 and s 4 have already been assigned). f b,2
is assigned this slot. The resulting sets are S 7 and F 7 .
Step 7: b(3) picks s 12 ∈ S 7 \ S A for f b,3 . f b,3 is assigned this slot. The resulting sets are S 8 and F 8 .
Step 8: b(4) is a dummy ight, remove it and skip to a(5).
a(5) picks s 13 ∈ S 8 \ S A for f a,7 (a(5) is a remaining ight, so it picks the earliest feasible slot in S 8 ∩ S main . s 10 and s 11 are in S 8 \ S main , and s 12 has been assigned before). f a,7 is assigned this slot. The resulting sets are S 9 and F 9 .
Step 9: a(6) picks s 10 ∈ S 9 \ S A for f a,5 (a(6) is a duplicate ight, so it picks the earliest feasible slot in S 9 \ S main . Note that s 10 is the slot f a,5 was assigned in the pre-competition stage). f a,5 is assigned this slot pro forma. The resulting sets are S 10 and F 10 .
Step 10: a(7) picks s 11 ∈ S 10 \ S A for f a,6 . f a,6 is assigned this slot pro forma. The resulting sets are S 11 and F 11 .
Step 11: c(2) picks s 9 ∈ S 11 \ S A for f c,2 (s 5 , s 6 , s 7 and s 8 have already been assigned).
f c,2 is assigned this slot. The resulting sets are S 12 and F 12 .
Step 12: c(3) picks s 1 ∈ S 12 \ S A for f c,3 . f c,3 is assigned this slot pro forma. The resulting sets are S 13 and F 13 . Note that F 13 = ∅. The main stage stops here.
Supplemental stage:
The is no slot in V ∩ S a for some a, so V 1 = V . Assign the earliest slot s 14 to b.
Example 4:
In this example, f c,1 has been delayed and cannot use the slot it was assigned in the last assignment. The same for f a,2 .
Pre-competition stage:
A tentative landing scheduleΠ is created as shown in the table above, and the set of occupied slot S 0−0 is {s 1, s 2 , ..., s 5 }.
The rst type 4 slot is s 1 as it is demanded only by a with f a,3 , so f a,3 is assigned this slot. The resulting sets are S 0−1 and F 0−1 .
The second type 4 slot is s 4 as it is demanded only by a with f a,2 , so f a,2 is assigned this slot. The resulting sets are S 0−2 and F 0−2 .
The third type 4 slot is s 5 as it is demanded only by c with f c,1 , so f c,1 is assigned this slot. The resulting sets are S 0−3 and F 0−3 . Now all slots are demanded by more than 1 airline. S main = S 0−3 = {s 2 , s 3 } and
Main stage:
For each a, let S a = Φ(a) from the last assignment (in the table above).
z = (b(1), a(1), a(2), c(1), a(3), a(4)).
a(1) represents f a,1 . a(2) and a(3) represent f a,2 and f a,3 , respectively. a(4) represents f a,(1) . b(1) represents f b,1 . c(1) represents f c,1 . S 1 = S 0−0 and F 1 = F .
Step 1: b(1) picks s 2 ∈ S 1 ∩ S a for f b,1 and a has a remaining/duplicate ght in F 1 , modify z by inserting a(1) in front of b(1). a(1) picks s 2 ∈ S 1 ∩ S a for f a,1 . Assign s 2 to f a,1 .
The resulting sets are S 1−1 and F
1−1 . ((iii)-(ii))
b(1) picks the next available slot s 3 ∈ S 1−1 ∩ S a and a has a remaining/duplicate ght in
a(2) picks s 4 ∈ S 1−1 ∩ S a . Assign s 4 pro forma to f a,2 and modify z by inserting a(3) behind a(2). The resulting sets are S 1−2 and F
1−2 . ((iii)-(iii))
a(3) picks s 1 ∈ S 1−2 ∩ S c for f a,3 and c has a remaining/duplicate ght in F 1−2 , modify z by inserting c(1) in front of a(3). c(1) picks s 5 ∈ S 1−2 ∩ S a for f c,1 . a(3) and c(1) form a cycle. f c,1 is assigned pro forma s 5 and f a,3 is assigned pro forma s 1 . The resulting sets are S 1−3 and F
1−3 . ((iii-vi)-(a))
s 5 is not demanded by b(1) (s 5 is some s x in Algorithm 1, and b(1) is the ight that inserted x(k − 1), which is a(2) here), so a(4) should be inserted behind a(3). But a(4) is a dummy ight, which means a has no remaining/duplicate ght in F 1−3 . So f b,1 is assigned s 3 . The resulting sets are S 1−4 and F
1−4 . ((iii-vi)-(b))
Note that F 1−4 = ∅. The main stage stops here.
Assign the earliest slot s 6 to a.
Properties of the Mechanism
Proposition 1: The multiple trading cycles mechanism φ is regular, ex post feasible, ex post non-wasteful, and respects property rights over S A .
Example 5:
We have shown that RBS does not respect property rights before a GDP starts by Proposition 2: The multiple trading cycles mechanism φ is ex post individually rational.
If an airline a only uses its own slots in S a under any ordering z, φ a (R, e) = Π Sa a with probability 1. But if it uses some other slots under some ordering z, φ a (R, e) would be preferred to Π Sa a .
Proposition 3: The multiple trading cycles mechanism φ is ex post Pareto ecient.
Suppose ϕ z (R, e) is a realized landing schedule of MTC. Φ inserted it, and so on. At the end, a(i) picks the next slot and the same argument applies until it gets the slot it was assigned in ϕ z (R, e).
In a housing market with strict preferences, the core is a subset of the Pareto set.
34 But in an airport slot allocation problem with strict preferences, the core might not be a subset of the Pareto set since S A = S.
35 A landing schedule in the core is not necessary Pareto ecient if some airline can benet by having a slot that is not owned by some airline. The following example shows a Pareto ecient landing schedule might not be in the core.
Example 6:
Π is Pareto ecient, but it is not in the core since a can use slots only in Φ(a) and be better o (as in Π ). Proposition 3 and Theorem 2 below imply that MTC selects landing schedules from the intersection of the core and the Pareto Set.
Theorem 2: The multiple trading cycles mechanism φ is ex post core-selecting. Theorem 3: The multiple trading cycles mechanism φ is strategy-proof.
There are two sources of strategy-proofness. The rst one is the randomness introduced in the main stage together with a feature of lexicographic preference that it does not sacrice the benet of a ight for the benet of a less important ight. By truth-telling, MTC minimizes the expected delays for each airline lexicographically. But if an airline deviates, it might be able to reduce the expected delays for some of its ights, but the expected delay for a more important ight will increase.
36
The next example will show the importance of randomness.
Recall that when (ii) each airline owns exactly one non-canceled ight and (iv) no airline owns a GDP slot, MTC reduces to random serial dictatorship; if we x an ordering z, it further reduces to serial dictatorship. However, when (iv) holds but not (ii), MTC with xed ordering is dierent from serial dictatorship. In this context, airlines are agents, so serial dictatorship would allow airline a to pick all slots it wants, then allow airline b to pick 34 In that problem, the core is equivalent to the core dened by weak domination, and the core dened by weak domination is a subset of the Pareto set.
35 Indeed, this is also true for a house allocation with existing tenants problem with strict preferences. A similar but distinct result can be found in Roth and Sotomayor (1992) : In a two-sided college admissions problem, the college-optimal stable matching does not need to be Pareto ecient for the colleges (Theorem 5.10), but this matching is in the core dened by weak domination (Theorem 5.36). 36 If the lexicographic preference assumption is relaxed, the same result might still be obtained if the size of the market goes to innite. all slots it wants (among those remaining), etc. It is well-known that serial dictatorship is strategy-proof, and the reason is that an airline does not need to manipulate its report to get the best set of available slots, but MTC with xed ordering does not have this feature.
We illustrate this point by the following example.
Example 7: (MTC with xed ordering is not strategy-proof )
Consider a case where (iv) holds but not (ii). There is no non-scarce resource in this example, so we can skip the pre-competition stage. Fix an ordering z, where z = (a(1), b(1), a(2), b (2)). a(1) represents the most important ight according to R a and a (2) represents the other. b (1) represents the most important ight according to R b and b (2) represents the other.
In this example, by either misreporting its importance ranking or earliest feasible arrival times (as in the left table above), a can gain by having s 2 (see the right table above. In the middle case, it can swap slots for f a,1 and f a,2 ).
The second source of strategy-proofness is the design of the pre-competition stage. If an airline knows one of the slots will be used by one of its ights only, say the most important one, then it will have the incentive to misreport its ranking such that this ight is the least important one; alternatively, it can misreport its earliest feasible arrival times such that each of its ights picks a slot for the next most important ight and the least important ight picks a slot for the most important ight. By doing either of these, all of its remaining ights would be weakly better o if one runs MTC without the pre-competition stage.
Example 8: (MTC without the pre-competition stage is not strategy-proof )
We drop the arguments for ϕ z (R, e) and write ϕ z . In this example, given a can swap slots for f a,1 and f a,2 whenever necessary, reporting either e a or R a will give a the same outcome, but reporting both of them together will give a the outcome of ϕ z (R, e). We use ϕ z to represent ϕ z ( R a , e a , (R, e) −a ) and ϕ z (R a , e a , (R, e) −a ) after necessary self-optimization.
There are three possible orderings: (2) An airline can freeze a ight f ∈ F o a in a slot s ∈ S a and eectively remove s from an instance. This is not a strategy in the induced preference revelation game of a mechanism, but rather a way to change the game. Schummer and Abizada (2017) show that DASO is non-manipulable by postponing a ight cancellation (an airline cannot gain by freezing a canceled ight in a slot s ∈ S a and reusing it later), while Schummer and Vohra (2013) show that both Compression and TC fail an even weaker condition.
37 For completeness, we provide an example in Appendix C to show Compression is manipulable by postponing a ight cancellation in our preference domain.
The above non-manipulable condition is dened for deterministic mechanisms. We dene the corresponding condition for stochastic mechanisms. A lottery mechanism φ is manipulable by postponing a ight cancellation if there are instances I = (S, A, F o , R, e, Φ)
, where L = p Π · Π and each Π is some landing schedule that contains landing schedule for a Π φ I a (R,e) ∪{s} a . In words, a lottery mechanism is manipulable by postponing a ight cancellation if an airline can gain by freezing a canceled ight in a slot s ∈ S a and then self-optimize using the slots in φ I a (R, e) ∪ s.
Thereon 4-1: The multiple trading cycles mechanism φ is non-manipulable by postponing a ight cancellation.
The proof is based on the following ideas. Suppose airline a freezes a canceled ight f ∈ F o a \ F a in a slot s ∈ S a , so both s and f are removed from the instance. First, the probabilities of getting better positions (for remaining ights in the main stage) in z are 37 Compression and TC fail a condition called non-manipulable via slot destructionan airline cannot gain by freezing a canceled ight in a slot s ∈ S a . higher if f is not removed. For instance, the probability of a(1) being the rst ight in z
if f is removed, and such probability increases to
if f is not removed. Second, removing s means a does not use s to trade, but MTC is ex post individually rational, putting s back into the instance would only make a weakly better o.
It is easy to see that from Claim 1 and Proposition 1, if a slot s ∈ S 0−0 is removed from an instance, then each ight with e f ≤ s would get a slot that is weakly later than otherwise, and if a ight f ∈ F is removed from an instance, then each ight in F \ {f } would get a weakly earlier slot in MTC (for any given z with f removed). Can an airline gain by freezing a non-canceled ight f a,i ∈ F a in a slot s ∈ S a ? The answer is maybe.
Theorem 4-2: Suppose f a,i is the most important ight of a in an instance I and MTC is used. If the earliest feasible available slot for f a,i , s, is in S a and s is a scarce resource, then a can weakly gain by freezing f a,i in s.
Putting s and f a,i into the instance would make a pay the position of a(1) in any ordering z to get s even though s is in S a (in this case, if a removes s and f , then the theorem applies to the next most important ight of a). However, if such s is a non-scarce resource, freezing f a,i in s makes a weakly worse o (this is by Theorem 4-1 because f a,i in this situation is eectively the same as a canceled ight to a in MTC). We illustrate these points by the following example.
Example 9:
Case 1: s 1 ∈ Φ(a) is a scarce resource (e f a,1 = 1). There are three possible orderings: (2)), and z 3 = (b(1), a(1), a(2)). Let a(i) represent f a,i for i ∈ {1, 2}. Each ordering realizes with probability 1 3
. While f a,1 always get s 1 (under z 3 , a(1) would be inserted in front of b(1)), f a,2 gets s 2 with probability 1 3
(only under z 1 ).
Consider if a freezes f a,1 in s 1 , so both f a,1 and s 1 are removed from the instance. There are two possible orderings: z 4 = (a(1), b(1)) and z 5 = (b(1), a(1)). Let a(1) represent f a,2 .
Each ordering realizes with probability 1 2
. Therefore, f a,2 gets s 2 with probability 1 2 , so its expected delay is lower. Case 2: s 3 ∈ Φ(a) is a non-scarce resource (e f a,1 = 3). s 3 is assigned to f a,1 in the pre-competition stage. There are also three possible orderings z 1 , z 2 and z 3 as in Case 1.
Let a(1) represent f a,2 and a(2) represent f a,1 (f a,1 is a duplicate ight). f a,2 gets s 2 with probability 2 3
(under z 1 and z 2 ). Consider if a freezes f a,1 in s 3 , so both f a,1 and s 3 are removed from the instance. Again, there are also two possible orderings z 4 and z 5 as in Case 1. Let a(1) represent f a,2 . Each ordering realizes with probability 1 2
. Therefore, f a,2 gets s 1 with probability 1 2 , so its expected delay is higher.
Case 3: Consider when f a,1 is canceled ((R,ẽ) is reported). s 3 ∈ Φ(a) is not in S 0−0 . a(2) now represents a dummy ight f a,1 . Everything else is the same as in Case 2.
The following mechanism is inspired by Theorem 4-2. We call the MTC that uses the following modied main stage Multiple Trading Cycles-2 (MTC-2). All results of MTC hold for MTC-2. MTC and MTC-2 are not the same mechanism as MTC-2 possibly favors some airlines that t the description of Theorem 4-2.
Modied Main Stage:
If this is the rst assignment in a GDP, for each a ∈ A, construct S a = Φ ex ante (a)
according to the initial slot ownership function Φ o . Otherwise, let S a = Φ(a) (from the last assignment). Start from the earliest slot in S main ∩ S A , if a slot in S a is the earliest feasible available slot in S main to the most important ight of a in F main , assign it to this ight and update S main to S (1) and F main to F (1) (in general, update S (t) to S (t+1) and F (t) to F (t+1) ).
Then start from the earliest slot in S (t) ∩ S A for t = 1, 2, ..., repeat the above procedure until there is no more such slot. Denote the set of slots being assigned here by S top and the set of ights that are assigned a slot here by F In Case 1 of Example 9, MTC-2 assigns s 1 to f a,1 and then selects z 4 and z 5 randomly, while MTC selects z 1 , z 2 , and z 3 randomly. One can modify YGMH-IGYT by using the modied main stage: Fix an ordering. If a house is owned by an agent and the house is his top choice, assign this house to this agent. Repeat this procedure until there is no more such house. Then run YGMH-IGYT with the reduced ordering (with these agents eliminated).
The outcome does not change because the positions of these agents in the original ordering are independent to the nal outcome. Each agent that is assigned a house here always obtains the same house (in any individually rational mechanism). This modication is compatible with the previous one.
Multiple Runways

An Extended Model
When there are multiple runways, there will be multiple slots available at a time. Let m be the number of runways, so the set of available GDP slots is S m = {s 1,1 , s 1,2 , ..., s 1,m , s 2,1 , ...}.
We assume airlines are indierent between slots of the same time.
38 Since we need strict preferences in MTC, we can use tiebreaking rules to eliminate these indierences.
Tiebreaking rule-1: Given S A and a preference prole induced by (R, e) with e f ∈ S for each ight f , construct a strict preference prole main with e f ∈ S m for each ight f as follows: For any airline a, given two slots of the same time, (1) if both slots are in S a or S b (for some b ∈ A) or S \ S A , then the slot with the lower index is strictly better,
if one slot is in S a and another is in S b , then the one in S a is strictly better, (3) if one slot is in S b and another is in S c , then the one is strictly better (see discussion below), and (4) if one slot is in S A and another is in S \ S A , then the one in S \ S A is strictly better.
Anything (xed or random) based on some exogenous parameters that do not create indierences can be lled in the blank. Abdulkadiro §lu and Sönmez (1999) propose a tiebreaking rule where in the situation of (3), a slot owned by a higher ranked owner in z is preferred.
39 The intuition behind (2) and (4) is that trading with another airline (for a slot in S main ) is not free (potentially make some slots in S a unavailable to itself ), so an airline might want to avoid trading whenever possible. Under Tiebreaking rule-1, all else being equal, for any airline a, slots in S \ S A are the best, slots in S a are in the middle, and slot in some S b are the worst.
Tiebreaking rule-2: Given S A and a preference prole induced by (R, e) with e f ∈ S for each ight f , construct a strict preference prole pre−competition with e f ∈ S Ehlers (2014); Erdil and Ergin (2017). 39 Under that tiebreaking rule, in situation (4), the one in S A is strictly better.
ight f as follows: For any airline a, given two slots of the same time, (1 ) if both slots are in S a or S \ S a , then the slot with the lower index is strictly better, and (2 ) if one slot is in S a and another is in S \ S a , then the one in S \ S a is strictly better. The intuition behind (2 ) is that trading a slot s ∈ S a for a slot in S \ S main eliminates the potential gain from s in the main stage. Under Tiebreaking rule-2, all else being equal, for any airline a, slots in S \ S a are the best, slots in S a are the worst. interval of a GDP slot s n is entirely owned by airline a before the GDP starts, endow s n,1 to a for each n. 40 Remove one copy of each initial slot that covers these s n 's. If s n is still being covered (by the remaining set of initial slots), endow s n,2 to a for each n. Procedure continues in a similar way until no more s n is covered. Then select an arbitrary airline b ∈ A...(if a is endowed s n,r for some n, then other airlines might be endowed s n,r+1 , and so on. If in a situation where t slots at time s n are being endowed but only r slots are available (r < t, there can be exempted ights, crossing runways, etc.), then remove all s n 's from Φ ex ante (A)).
Modied Pre-competition Stage:
(a) Order ights in F in increasing order of e f (break ties arbitrarily).
(b) Assign ights sequentially to the earliest slot (start from the one with the lowest index) in S that each ight can feasibly use. Denote the tentative landing schedule byΠ and the set of occupied slots by S
and e f > s(−1), where s(−1) is some last slot before s in S 0−0 (f occupies s inΠ and will not compete for slots earlier than s. Since in Π, all ights that arrive strictly earlier than f will get a slot no later (compare to strictly earlier in the single runway problem) than s, this condition also implies that ∀f ∈ F 0−0 with e f ≤ s(−1),Π −1 (f ) ≤ s. Therefore, there are sucient slots to accommodate ights that arrive earlier than f , so they will not compete for s); Denote the resulting set of slots by S main .
(Each slot that is tentatively assigned will be assigned to one of the ights that obtains a slot of the same time here in the main stage. Assigning slots tentatively allows us to apply Tiebreaking rule-1 for all ights in the main stage (Tiebreaking rule-2 has fullled its mission already); otherwise, we would need to apply Tiebreaking rule-2 for duplicate ights.
The two other stages are the same except the S a for each a ∈ A is constructed earlier and a duplicate ight will be assigned pro forma the slot it was assigned in the pre-competition stage or a slot of the same time. The nal assignment depends on the realized ordering in the main stage and Tiebreaking rule-1.
We now say s is demanded only by some airline a if (c-i) and (c-ii) hold simultaneously and s is demanded by more than 1 airline if either (c-i) or (c-ii) fails. Recall the 4 types of slots: Type 1 slots satisfy (c-i) but not (c-ii), type 2 slots do not satisfy both, type 3 slots satisfy (c-ii) but not (c-i), and type 4 slots satisfy both.)
Example 10: 
This example is modied from Example 1. We only need to check the new condition Example 11: Remark 2: If a slot s n,1 does not satisfy (c-ii) (some ight of other airlines also wants this slot but has been assigned a later slot inΠ), then each s n,r also fails (c-ii). But if a slot s n,1 does not satisfy (c-i), some s n,r might satisfy (c-i). Therefore, type 1 and type 2 slots may coexist in some (s n,1 , s n,2 , ..., s n,m ) (by construction, type 2 slots have lower indices). Similarly, type 3 and type 4 slots may coexist in some (s n,1 , s n,2 , ..., s n,m ) (a slot is type 3 or type 4 is determined in the pre-competition stage. Also, there can be slots in S \ S 0−0 here as well).
Example 12:
In Example 12, s 2,1 is a type 2 slots and s 2,2 is a type 1 slot. Note that s 1,1 is also a type 1 slot. s 3,1 is a type 3 slot since (c-i) fails but (c-ii)-(b) is satised.
Example 13:
In Example 13, s 2,1 is a type 3 slots and s 2,2 is a type 4 slot. Suppose now s 2,2 ∈ Φ(c). In the modied pre-competition stage, s 2,2 is tentatively assigned to f c,1 , so S 0−1 = {s 1,1 , s 2,1 }.
However, according to Tiebreaking rule-2, f c,1 will pick s 2,1 . Therefore, S main = {s 1,1 , s 2,2 } = 
In situation (3) of Tiebreaking rule-1, break ties based on alphabetical order. That is, slots in S a are better than slots in S b , etc. There is no non-scarce resource in this example, so we can skip the pre-competition stage.
Let a(i) represent f a,i for i = {1, 2} and others represent their only ights.
Case 1: a(1) picks s 1,1 ∈ S b for f a,1 , then b(1) will be inserted in front of a(1). b(1) picks s 3,1 ∈ S a for f b,1 . a(1) and b(1) form a cycle. f a,1 is assigned s 1,1 and f b,1 is assigned s 3,1 .
Then s 2,1 goes to a(2), s 4,1 goes to c(1), s 1,2 goes to d(1), and s 5,1 goes to e(1). Now suppose MTC breaks ties based on reverse alphabetical order.
Case 2: a(1) picks s 1,2 ∈ S c for f a,1 , then c(1) will be inserted in front of a(1). c(1) picks s 2,1 ∈ S a for f c,1 . a(1) and c(1) form a cycle. f a,1 is assigned s 2,1 and f c,1 is assigned s 2,1 .
Then s 3,1 goes to a(2), s 4,1 goes to b(1), s 1,2 goes to d(1), and s 5,1 goes to e(1).
Note that both landing schedules are Pareto ecient and individually rational but the Case 2 landing schedule is not in the core because it is dominated by the Case 1 landing schedule via subgroup {a, b}. Yet MTC respects property rights over S A because the denition only requires that a trades a slot in S a for a better slot and s 1,2 is better than s 2,1 and s 3,1 . When f a,1 is picking a slot, a is in two cycles under its true preference, where one of the cycles leads to a better outcome for a. 42 Indeed, condition (iv) in the Proof of Theorem 2 no longer holds in the extended model because now f a,j does not have to pick in S A . In Example 14, f a,1 can pick s 1,2 / ∈ S A = S a ∪ S b .
Conclusion
This paper studies airport slot allocation problems. When inclement weather strikes a heavily used airport, its landing schedule must be recongured as now it requires more time to land a plane. Some ights have to be postponed, but such postponements may be too costly to airlines, and so the airlines might cancel those ights. Cancellations and delays create vacant slots in the landing schedule, which are new resources to be reallocated.
We argue that the currently used mechanism does not respect property rights before and after a GDP starts. The mechanism we proposed solicits private information such as earliest feasible arrival times and importance rankings from the airlines. Based on this information, the mechanism produces outcomes that are individually rational, Pareto ecient and in the core. Our mechanism also respects property rights before and after a GDP starts, is strategy-proof and non-manipulable by postponing a ight cancellation.
In the extended model with multiple runways, a modied version of our mechanism with tiebreaking inherits most of the aforementioned properties but might produce outcomes the slot that it demands. This is also a cycle in Algorithm 2 for (S , F ). (Case 2 includes
and (iii-iv)-(c).)
Hence Algorithm 1 nds a cycle in Algorithm 2 and implements the associated trades for any set of slots and set of ights. In Algorithm 2, a cycle that is not removed at any step remains a cycle at the next step, so for any given ordering z, the main stages of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 produce the same outcome.
Proof of Claim 1: Suppose not. ∃s ∈ S 0−0 such that Π −1 (s) = ∅, where Π is some feasible and non-wasteful landing schedule. By feasibility, the number of slots earlier than s that can be occupied is xed. Π −1 (s) = ∅ but s ∈ S 0−0 then implies ∃f ∈ F such that e f ≤ s < Π(f ). Contradicts to the non-wastefulness of Π.
Proof of Proposition 1: Regularity: This is by the construction of the mechanism. Ex post feasibility: For any ordering z, at each stage and each step, no ight gets an infeasible slot. Ex post non-wastefulness: This is also by the construction of the mechanism. For any ordering z, let ϕ z be the induced schedule mechanism. If ∃f ∈ F such that s ∈ V with e f < s, then it must be the case that ϕ z f (R, e) < s. Respects property rights over S A : Without loss of generality, we can focus on the main stage. At each step a slot in some S a is being assigned (or assigned pro forma), there are three possibilities: (i) It is assigned to the most important remaining/duplicate ight of a; (ii) a trades it for a better slot for its most important remaining/duplicate ight; (iii) a has no more remaining/duplicate ight and this slot is assigned to some airline in the main stage (or the supplemental stage). In (iii), there is no better slot for a.
Proof of Proposition 2: For any ordering z, let ϕ z be the induced schedule mechanism.
(ii) If f a,i = f a,j , a picks ϕ z f a,i it was a type 2 slot; moreover, it makes the next slot a type 4 slot if it was a type 3 slot. In higher than f c,x and picks s in ϕby q i I,t . Given a(i − 1) is drawn before, when the t-th ight is being drawn but a(i) has not been drawn yet, the probability for a(i) to get this position t in z in instance I is denoted by p i I,t . We list p i I,t 's for a(1)'s and a(2)'s in the table below. 1 for all a(i). Self optimization after obtaining φ I a (R, e) : If s cannot be used by any ight of a, we are done. Otherwise, a can give s to some of its ights and obtain some self-optimized landing schedule for a Π φ I a (R,e) ∪{s} a . Let a(j) be the most important ight that might be assigned s in all Π φ I a (R,e) ∪{s} a 's.
Case 1: If a(j) obtains some scarce resource s in MTC. The fact that s, which is not demanded by another airline, might be given to a(j) implies that s is earlier than the sequence of slots that contains s (suppose s is later than the sequence. This contradicts the way we pick a(j) as a(j) always gets an earlier slot in the sequence). The expected delay for a(j) is therefore constant as it always gets s. Still, we have D i,I
1 ≤ D i,I 1 for each a(i)in addition to all of its ights pick weakly later, each remaining ight that is less important than a(j) picks strictly later because a(j + 1) can use a(j)'s position in z if s is in the instance, and so on. So a is not better o in this case (the best thing a can do is to let a(j) pick a slot for a(j + 1), a(j + 1) pick a slot for a(j + 2), etc. But this is the same as having s put in the instance).
Case 2: If a(j) obtains some non-scarce resource s in MTC. The fact that s, which is not demanded by another airline, might be given to a(j) implies that s is earlier than s . The expected delay for a(j) is therefore constant as it always gets s.
(♣) If s cannot be used by other ights of a or s can be used by some ights of a but each of these ights obtains a slot better than s in MTC, we are done because of D i,I
1 ≤ D i,I 1 for each a(i). Otherwise, let f ∈ F a be the most important ight that might be assigned s . If f obtains some scarce resource s in MTC, the expected delay for f is therefore constant as it always gets s . Still, we have D t be the expected delay for ight a(i) in I in landing schedules that are induced by initial ordering z's with a(i) in position t conditioning on a(1) gets the rst position in z with probability 1 (that is, q 
